mirror of
https://github.com/superseriousbusiness/gotosocial.git
synced 2024-12-23 18:52:11 +00:00
121 lines
4.5 KiB
Go
121 lines
4.5 KiB
Go
|
package handlers
|
||
|
|
||
|
import (
|
||
|
"net/http"
|
||
|
"regexp"
|
||
|
"strings"
|
||
|
)
|
||
|
|
||
|
var (
|
||
|
// De-facto standard header keys.
|
||
|
xForwardedFor = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-For")
|
||
|
xForwardedHost = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-Host")
|
||
|
xForwardedProto = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-Proto")
|
||
|
xForwardedScheme = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-Scheme")
|
||
|
xRealIP = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("X-Real-IP")
|
||
|
)
|
||
|
|
||
|
var (
|
||
|
// RFC7239 defines a new "Forwarded: " header designed to replace the
|
||
|
// existing use of X-Forwarded-* headers.
|
||
|
// e.g. Forwarded: for=192.0.2.60;proto=https;by=203.0.113.43
|
||
|
forwarded = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("Forwarded")
|
||
|
// Allows for a sub-match of the first value after 'for=' to the next
|
||
|
// comma, semi-colon or space. The match is case-insensitive.
|
||
|
forRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(?:for=)([^(;|,| )]+)`)
|
||
|
// Allows for a sub-match for the first instance of scheme (http|https)
|
||
|
// prefixed by 'proto='. The match is case-insensitive.
|
||
|
protoRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(?:proto=)(https|http)`)
|
||
|
)
|
||
|
|
||
|
// ProxyHeaders inspects common reverse proxy headers and sets the corresponding
|
||
|
// fields in the HTTP request struct. These are X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP
|
||
|
// for the remote (client) IP address, X-Forwarded-Proto or X-Forwarded-Scheme
|
||
|
// for the scheme (http|https), X-Forwarded-Host for the host and the RFC7239
|
||
|
// Forwarded header, which may include both client IPs and schemes.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// NOTE: This middleware should only be used when behind a reverse
|
||
|
// proxy like nginx, HAProxy or Apache. Reverse proxies that don't (or are
|
||
|
// configured not to) strip these headers from client requests, or where these
|
||
|
// headers are accepted "as is" from a remote client (e.g. when Go is not behind
|
||
|
// a proxy), can manifest as a vulnerability if your application uses these
|
||
|
// headers for validating the 'trustworthiness' of a request.
|
||
|
func ProxyHeaders(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||
|
fn := func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||
|
// Set the remote IP with the value passed from the proxy.
|
||
|
if fwd := getIP(r); fwd != "" {
|
||
|
r.RemoteAddr = fwd
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Set the scheme (proto) with the value passed from the proxy.
|
||
|
if scheme := getScheme(r); scheme != "" {
|
||
|
r.URL.Scheme = scheme
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
// Set the host with the value passed by the proxy
|
||
|
if r.Header.Get(xForwardedHost) != "" {
|
||
|
r.Host = r.Header.Get(xForwardedHost)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
// Call the next handler in the chain.
|
||
|
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return http.HandlerFunc(fn)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// getIP retrieves the IP from the X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP and RFC7239
|
||
|
// Forwarded headers (in that order).
|
||
|
func getIP(r *http.Request) string {
|
||
|
var addr string
|
||
|
|
||
|
if fwd := r.Header.Get(xForwardedFor); fwd != "" {
|
||
|
// Only grab the first (client) address. Note that '192.168.0.1,
|
||
|
// 10.1.1.1' is a valid key for X-Forwarded-For where addresses after
|
||
|
// the first may represent forwarding proxies earlier in the chain.
|
||
|
s := strings.Index(fwd, ", ")
|
||
|
if s == -1 {
|
||
|
s = len(fwd)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
addr = fwd[:s]
|
||
|
} else if fwd := r.Header.Get(xRealIP); fwd != "" {
|
||
|
// X-Real-IP should only contain one IP address (the client making the
|
||
|
// request).
|
||
|
addr = fwd
|
||
|
} else if fwd := r.Header.Get(forwarded); fwd != "" {
|
||
|
// match should contain at least two elements if the protocol was
|
||
|
// specified in the Forwarded header. The first element will always be
|
||
|
// the 'for=' capture, which we ignore. In the case of multiple IP
|
||
|
// addresses (for=8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4,172.16.1.20 is valid) we only
|
||
|
// extract the first, which should be the client IP.
|
||
|
if match := forRegex.FindStringSubmatch(fwd); len(match) > 1 {
|
||
|
// IPv6 addresses in Forwarded headers are quoted-strings. We strip
|
||
|
// these quotes.
|
||
|
addr = strings.Trim(match[1], `"`)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return addr
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// getScheme retrieves the scheme from the X-Forwarded-Proto and RFC7239
|
||
|
// Forwarded headers (in that order).
|
||
|
func getScheme(r *http.Request) string {
|
||
|
var scheme string
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Retrieve the scheme from X-Forwarded-Proto.
|
||
|
if proto := r.Header.Get(xForwardedProto); proto != "" {
|
||
|
scheme = strings.ToLower(proto)
|
||
|
} else if proto = r.Header.Get(xForwardedScheme); proto != "" {
|
||
|
scheme = strings.ToLower(proto)
|
||
|
} else if proto = r.Header.Get(forwarded); proto != "" {
|
||
|
// match should contain at least two elements if the protocol was
|
||
|
// specified in the Forwarded header. The first element will always be
|
||
|
// the 'proto=' capture, which we ignore. In the case of multiple proto
|
||
|
// parameters (invalid) we only extract the first.
|
||
|
if match := protoRegex.FindStringSubmatch(proto); len(match) > 1 {
|
||
|
scheme = strings.ToLower(match[1])
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return scheme
|
||
|
}
|