mirror of
https://github.com/superseriousbusiness/gotosocial.git
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356e238793
Bumps [github.com/go-playground/validator/v10](https://github.com/go-playground/validator) from 10.11.1 to 10.11.2. - [Release notes](https://github.com/go-playground/validator/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/go-playground/validator/compare/v10.11.1...v10.11.2) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: github.com/go-playground/validator/v10 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-patch ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
1199 lines
36 KiB
Go
1199 lines
36 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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// Package autocert provides automatic access to certificates from Let's Encrypt
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// and any other ACME-based CA.
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//
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// This package is a work in progress and makes no API stability promises.
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package autocert
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/tls"
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"crypto/x509"
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"crypto/x509/pkix"
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"encoding/pem"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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mathrand "math/rand"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"path"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/acme"
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"golang.org/x/net/idna"
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)
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// DefaultACMEDirectory is the default ACME Directory URL used when the Manager's Client is nil.
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const DefaultACMEDirectory = "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory"
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// createCertRetryAfter is how much time to wait before removing a failed state
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// entry due to an unsuccessful createCert call.
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// This is a variable instead of a const for testing.
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// TODO: Consider making it configurable or an exp backoff?
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var createCertRetryAfter = time.Minute
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// pseudoRand is safe for concurrent use.
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var pseudoRand *lockedMathRand
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var errPreRFC = errors.New("autocert: ACME server doesn't support RFC 8555")
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func init() {
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src := mathrand.NewSource(time.Now().UnixNano())
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pseudoRand = &lockedMathRand{rnd: mathrand.New(src)}
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}
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// AcceptTOS is a Manager.Prompt function that always returns true to
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// indicate acceptance of the CA's Terms of Service during account
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// registration.
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func AcceptTOS(tosURL string) bool { return true }
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// HostPolicy specifies which host names the Manager is allowed to respond to.
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// It returns a non-nil error if the host should be rejected.
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// The returned error is accessible via tls.Conn.Handshake and its callers.
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// See Manager's HostPolicy field and GetCertificate method docs for more details.
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type HostPolicy func(ctx context.Context, host string) error
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// HostWhitelist returns a policy where only the specified host names are allowed.
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// Only exact matches are currently supported. Subdomains, regexp or wildcard
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// will not match.
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//
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// Note that all hosts will be converted to Punycode via idna.Lookup.ToASCII so that
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// Manager.GetCertificate can handle the Unicode IDN and mixedcase hosts correctly.
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// Invalid hosts will be silently ignored.
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func HostWhitelist(hosts ...string) HostPolicy {
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whitelist := make(map[string]bool, len(hosts))
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for _, h := range hosts {
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if h, err := idna.Lookup.ToASCII(h); err == nil {
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whitelist[h] = true
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}
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}
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return func(_ context.Context, host string) error {
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if !whitelist[host] {
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return fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: host %q not configured in HostWhitelist", host)
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}
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return nil
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}
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}
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// defaultHostPolicy is used when Manager.HostPolicy is not set.
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func defaultHostPolicy(context.Context, string) error {
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return nil
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}
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// Manager is a stateful certificate manager built on top of acme.Client.
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// It obtains and refreshes certificates automatically using "tls-alpn-01"
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// or "http-01" challenge types, as well as providing them to a TLS server
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// via tls.Config.
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//
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// You must specify a cache implementation, such as DirCache,
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// to reuse obtained certificates across program restarts.
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// Otherwise your server is very likely to exceed the certificate
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// issuer's request rate limits.
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type Manager struct {
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// Prompt specifies a callback function to conditionally accept a CA's Terms of Service (TOS).
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// The registration may require the caller to agree to the CA's TOS.
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// If so, Manager calls Prompt with a TOS URL provided by the CA. Prompt should report
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// whether the caller agrees to the terms.
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//
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// To always accept the terms, the callers can use AcceptTOS.
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Prompt func(tosURL string) bool
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// Cache optionally stores and retrieves previously-obtained certificates
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// and other state. If nil, certs will only be cached for the lifetime of
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// the Manager. Multiple Managers can share the same Cache.
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//
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// Using a persistent Cache, such as DirCache, is strongly recommended.
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Cache Cache
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// HostPolicy controls which domains the Manager will attempt
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// to retrieve new certificates for. It does not affect cached certs.
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//
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// If non-nil, HostPolicy is called before requesting a new cert.
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// If nil, all hosts are currently allowed. This is not recommended,
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// as it opens a potential attack where clients connect to a server
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// by IP address and pretend to be asking for an incorrect host name.
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// Manager will attempt to obtain a certificate for that host, incorrectly,
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// eventually reaching the CA's rate limit for certificate requests
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// and making it impossible to obtain actual certificates.
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//
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// See GetCertificate for more details.
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HostPolicy HostPolicy
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// RenewBefore optionally specifies how early certificates should
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// be renewed before they expire.
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//
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// If zero, they're renewed 30 days before expiration.
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RenewBefore time.Duration
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// Client is used to perform low-level operations, such as account registration
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// and requesting new certificates.
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//
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// If Client is nil, a zero-value acme.Client is used with DefaultACMEDirectory
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// as the directory endpoint.
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// If the Client.Key is nil, a new ECDSA P-256 key is generated and,
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// if Cache is not nil, stored in cache.
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//
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// Mutating the field after the first call of GetCertificate method will have no effect.
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Client *acme.Client
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// Email optionally specifies a contact email address.
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// This is used by CAs, such as Let's Encrypt, to notify about problems
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// with issued certificates.
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//
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// If the Client's account key is already registered, Email is not used.
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Email string
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// ForceRSA used to make the Manager generate RSA certificates. It is now ignored.
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//
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// Deprecated: the Manager will request the correct type of certificate based
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// on what each client supports.
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ForceRSA bool
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// ExtraExtensions are used when generating a new CSR (Certificate Request),
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// thus allowing customization of the resulting certificate.
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// For instance, TLS Feature Extension (RFC 7633) can be used
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// to prevent an OCSP downgrade attack.
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//
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// The field value is passed to crypto/x509.CreateCertificateRequest
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// in the template's ExtraExtensions field as is.
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ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension
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// ExternalAccountBinding optionally represents an arbitrary binding to an
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// account of the CA to which the ACME server is tied.
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// See RFC 8555, Section 7.3.4 for more details.
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ExternalAccountBinding *acme.ExternalAccountBinding
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clientMu sync.Mutex
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client *acme.Client // initialized by acmeClient method
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stateMu sync.Mutex
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state map[certKey]*certState
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// renewal tracks the set of domains currently running renewal timers.
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renewalMu sync.Mutex
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renewal map[certKey]*domainRenewal
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// challengeMu guards tryHTTP01, certTokens and httpTokens.
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challengeMu sync.RWMutex
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// tryHTTP01 indicates whether the Manager should try "http-01" challenge type
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// during the authorization flow.
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tryHTTP01 bool
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// httpTokens contains response body values for http-01 challenges
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// and is keyed by the URL path at which a challenge response is expected
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// to be provisioned.
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// The entries are stored for the duration of the authorization flow.
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httpTokens map[string][]byte
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// certTokens contains temporary certificates for tls-alpn-01 challenges
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// and is keyed by the domain name which matches the ClientHello server name.
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// The entries are stored for the duration of the authorization flow.
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certTokens map[string]*tls.Certificate
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// nowFunc, if not nil, returns the current time. This may be set for
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// testing purposes.
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nowFunc func() time.Time
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}
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// certKey is the key by which certificates are tracked in state, renewal and cache.
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type certKey struct {
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domain string // without trailing dot
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isRSA bool // RSA cert for legacy clients (as opposed to default ECDSA)
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isToken bool // tls-based challenge token cert; key type is undefined regardless of isRSA
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}
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func (c certKey) String() string {
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if c.isToken {
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return c.domain + "+token"
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}
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if c.isRSA {
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return c.domain + "+rsa"
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}
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return c.domain
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}
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// TLSConfig creates a new TLS config suitable for net/http.Server servers,
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// supporting HTTP/2 and the tls-alpn-01 ACME challenge type.
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func (m *Manager) TLSConfig() *tls.Config {
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return &tls.Config{
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GetCertificate: m.GetCertificate,
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NextProtos: []string{
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"h2", "http/1.1", // enable HTTP/2
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acme.ALPNProto, // enable tls-alpn ACME challenges
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},
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}
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}
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// GetCertificate implements the tls.Config.GetCertificate hook.
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// It provides a TLS certificate for hello.ServerName host, including answering
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// tls-alpn-01 challenges.
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// All other fields of hello are ignored.
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//
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// If m.HostPolicy is non-nil, GetCertificate calls the policy before requesting
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// a new cert. A non-nil error returned from m.HostPolicy halts TLS negotiation.
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// The error is propagated back to the caller of GetCertificate and is user-visible.
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// This does not affect cached certs. See HostPolicy field description for more details.
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//
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// If GetCertificate is used directly, instead of via Manager.TLSConfig, package users will
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// also have to add acme.ALPNProto to NextProtos for tls-alpn-01, or use HTTPHandler for http-01.
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func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
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if m.Prompt == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: Manager.Prompt not set")
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}
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name := hello.ServerName
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if name == "" {
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return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing server name")
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}
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if !strings.Contains(strings.Trim(name, "."), ".") {
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return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: server name component count invalid")
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}
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// Note that this conversion is necessary because some server names in the handshakes
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// started by some clients (such as cURL) are not converted to Punycode, which will
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// prevent us from obtaining certificates for them. In addition, we should also treat
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// example.com and EXAMPLE.COM as equivalent and return the same certificate for them.
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// Fortunately, this conversion also helped us deal with this kind of mixedcase problems.
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//
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// Due to the "σςΣ" problem (see https://unicode.org/faq/idn.html#22), we can't use
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// idna.Punycode.ToASCII (or just idna.ToASCII) here.
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name, err := idna.Lookup.ToASCII(name)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: server name contains invalid character")
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}
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// In the worst-case scenario, the timeout needs to account for caching, host policy,
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// domain ownership verification and certificate issuance.
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute)
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defer cancel()
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// Check whether this is a token cert requested for TLS-ALPN challenge.
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if wantsTokenCert(hello) {
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m.challengeMu.RLock()
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defer m.challengeMu.RUnlock()
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if cert := m.certTokens[name]; cert != nil {
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return cert, nil
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}
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if cert, err := m.cacheGet(ctx, certKey{domain: name, isToken: true}); err == nil {
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return cert, nil
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}
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// TODO: cache error results?
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: no token cert for %q", name)
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}
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// regular domain
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ck := certKey{
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domain: strings.TrimSuffix(name, "."), // golang.org/issue/18114
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isRSA: !supportsECDSA(hello),
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}
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cert, err := m.cert(ctx, ck)
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if err == nil {
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return cert, nil
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}
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if err != ErrCacheMiss {
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return nil, err
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}
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// first-time
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if err := m.hostPolicy()(ctx, name); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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cert, err = m.createCert(ctx, ck)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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m.cachePut(ctx, ck, cert)
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return cert, nil
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}
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// wantsTokenCert reports whether a TLS request with SNI is made by a CA server
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// for a challenge verification.
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func wantsTokenCert(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) bool {
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// tls-alpn-01
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if len(hello.SupportedProtos) == 1 && hello.SupportedProtos[0] == acme.ALPNProto {
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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func supportsECDSA(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) bool {
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// The "signature_algorithms" extension, if present, limits the key exchange
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// algorithms allowed by the cipher suites. See RFC 5246, section 7.4.1.4.1.
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if hello.SignatureSchemes != nil {
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ecdsaOK := false
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schemeLoop:
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for _, scheme := range hello.SignatureSchemes {
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const tlsECDSAWithSHA1 tls.SignatureScheme = 0x0203 // constant added in Go 1.10
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switch scheme {
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case tlsECDSAWithSHA1, tls.ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256,
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tls.ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, tls.ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512:
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ecdsaOK = true
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break schemeLoop
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}
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}
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if !ecdsaOK {
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return false
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}
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}
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if hello.SupportedCurves != nil {
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ecdsaOK := false
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for _, curve := range hello.SupportedCurves {
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if curve == tls.CurveP256 {
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ecdsaOK = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !ecdsaOK {
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return false
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}
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}
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for _, suite := range hello.CipherSuites {
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switch suite {
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case tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
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tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
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tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
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tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
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tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
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tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
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tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// HTTPHandler configures the Manager to provision ACME "http-01" challenge responses.
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// It returns an http.Handler that responds to the challenges and must be
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// running on port 80. If it receives a request that is not an ACME challenge,
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// it delegates the request to the optional fallback handler.
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//
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// If fallback is nil, the returned handler redirects all GET and HEAD requests
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// to the default TLS port 443 with 302 Found status code, preserving the original
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// request path and query. It responds with 400 Bad Request to all other HTTP methods.
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// The fallback is not protected by the optional HostPolicy.
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//
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// Because the fallback handler is run with unencrypted port 80 requests,
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// the fallback should not serve TLS-only requests.
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//
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// If HTTPHandler is never called, the Manager will only use the "tls-alpn-01"
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// challenge for domain verification.
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func (m *Manager) HTTPHandler(fallback http.Handler) http.Handler {
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m.challengeMu.Lock()
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defer m.challengeMu.Unlock()
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m.tryHTTP01 = true
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if fallback == nil {
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fallback = http.HandlerFunc(handleHTTPRedirect)
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}
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/.well-known/acme-challenge/") {
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fallback.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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// A reasonable context timeout for cache and host policy only,
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// because we don't wait for a new certificate issuance here.
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), time.Minute)
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defer cancel()
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if err := m.hostPolicy()(ctx, r.Host); err != nil {
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http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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data, err := m.httpToken(ctx, r.URL.Path)
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusNotFound)
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return
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}
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w.Write(data)
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})
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}
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func handleHTTPRedirect(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != "GET" && r.Method != "HEAD" {
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http.Error(w, "Use HTTPS", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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target := "https://" + stripPort(r.Host) + r.URL.RequestURI()
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http.Redirect(w, r, target, http.StatusFound)
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}
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func stripPort(hostport string) string {
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(hostport)
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if err != nil {
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return hostport
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}
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return net.JoinHostPort(host, "443")
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}
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// cert returns an existing certificate either from m.state or cache.
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// If a certificate is found in cache but not in m.state, the latter will be filled
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// with the cached value.
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func (m *Manager) cert(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
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m.stateMu.Lock()
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if s, ok := m.state[ck]; ok {
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m.stateMu.Unlock()
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s.RLock()
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defer s.RUnlock()
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return s.tlscert()
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}
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defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
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cert, err := m.cacheGet(ctx, ck)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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signer, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
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if !ok {
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return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key cannot sign")
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}
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if m.state == nil {
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m.state = make(map[certKey]*certState)
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}
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s := &certState{
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key: signer,
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cert: cert.Certificate,
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leaf: cert.Leaf,
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}
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m.state[ck] = s
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m.startRenew(ck, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter)
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return cert, nil
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}
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// cacheGet always returns a valid certificate, or an error otherwise.
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// If a cached certificate exists but is not valid, ErrCacheMiss is returned.
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func (m *Manager) cacheGet(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
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if m.Cache == nil {
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return nil, ErrCacheMiss
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|
}
|
|
data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, ck.String())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// private
|
|
priv, pub := pem.Decode(data)
|
|
if priv == nil || !strings.Contains(priv.Type, "PRIVATE") {
|
|
return nil, ErrCacheMiss
|
|
}
|
|
privKey, err := parsePrivateKey(priv.Bytes)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// public
|
|
var pubDER [][]byte
|
|
for len(pub) > 0 {
|
|
var b *pem.Block
|
|
b, pub = pem.Decode(pub)
|
|
if b == nil {
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
pubDER = append(pubDER, b.Bytes)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(pub) > 0 {
|
|
// Leftover content not consumed by pem.Decode. Corrupt. Ignore.
|
|
return nil, ErrCacheMiss
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// verify and create TLS cert
|
|
leaf, err := validCert(ck, pubDER, privKey, m.now())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, ErrCacheMiss
|
|
}
|
|
tlscert := &tls.Certificate{
|
|
Certificate: pubDER,
|
|
PrivateKey: privKey,
|
|
Leaf: leaf,
|
|
}
|
|
return tlscert, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (m *Manager) cachePut(ctx context.Context, ck certKey, tlscert *tls.Certificate) error {
|
|
if m.Cache == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// contains PEM-encoded data
|
|
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
|
|
|
// private
|
|
switch key := tlscert.PrivateKey.(type) {
|
|
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
|
|
if err := encodeECDSAKey(&buf, key); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
|
|
b := x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(key)
|
|
pb := &pem.Block{Type: "RSA PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: b}
|
|
if err := pem.Encode(&buf, pb); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
return errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown private key type")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// public
|
|
for _, b := range tlscert.Certificate {
|
|
pb := &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: b}
|
|
if err := pem.Encode(&buf, pb); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return m.Cache.Put(ctx, ck.String(), buf.Bytes())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func encodeECDSAKey(w io.Writer, key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error {
|
|
b, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
pb := &pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: b}
|
|
return pem.Encode(w, pb)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// createCert starts the domain ownership verification and returns a certificate
|
|
// for that domain upon success.
|
|
//
|
|
// If the domain is already being verified, it waits for the existing verification to complete.
|
|
// Either way, createCert blocks for the duration of the whole process.
|
|
func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
|
|
// TODO: maybe rewrite this whole piece using sync.Once
|
|
state, err := m.certState(ck)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
// state may exist if another goroutine is already working on it
|
|
// in which case just wait for it to finish
|
|
if !state.locked {
|
|
state.RLock()
|
|
defer state.RUnlock()
|
|
return state.tlscert()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We are the first; state is locked.
|
|
// Unblock the readers when domain ownership is verified
|
|
// and we got the cert or the process failed.
|
|
defer state.Unlock()
|
|
state.locked = false
|
|
|
|
der, leaf, err := m.authorizedCert(ctx, state.key, ck)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Remove the failed state after some time,
|
|
// making the manager call createCert again on the following TLS hello.
|
|
didRemove := testDidRemoveState // The lifetime of this timer is untracked, so copy mutable local state to avoid races.
|
|
time.AfterFunc(createCertRetryAfter, func() {
|
|
defer didRemove(ck)
|
|
m.stateMu.Lock()
|
|
defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
|
|
// Verify the state hasn't changed and it's still invalid
|
|
// before deleting.
|
|
s, ok := m.state[ck]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := validCert(ck, s.cert, s.key, m.now()); err == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
delete(m.state, ck)
|
|
})
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
state.cert = der
|
|
state.leaf = leaf
|
|
m.startRenew(ck, state.key, state.leaf.NotAfter)
|
|
return state.tlscert()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// certState returns a new or existing certState.
|
|
// If a new certState is returned, state.exist is false and the state is locked.
|
|
// The returned error is non-nil only in the case where a new state could not be created.
|
|
func (m *Manager) certState(ck certKey) (*certState, error) {
|
|
m.stateMu.Lock()
|
|
defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
|
|
if m.state == nil {
|
|
m.state = make(map[certKey]*certState)
|
|
}
|
|
// existing state
|
|
if state, ok := m.state[ck]; ok {
|
|
return state, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// new locked state
|
|
var (
|
|
err error
|
|
key crypto.Signer
|
|
)
|
|
if ck.isRSA {
|
|
key, err = rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
|
|
} else {
|
|
key, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
state := &certState{
|
|
key: key,
|
|
locked: true,
|
|
}
|
|
state.Lock() // will be unlocked by m.certState caller
|
|
m.state[ck] = state
|
|
return state, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// authorizedCert starts the domain ownership verification process and requests a new cert upon success.
|
|
// The key argument is the certificate private key.
|
|
func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, ck certKey) (der [][]byte, leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) {
|
|
csr, err := certRequest(key, ck.domain, m.ExtraExtensions)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
dir, err := client.Discover(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if dir.OrderURL == "" {
|
|
return nil, nil, errPreRFC
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
o, err := m.verifyRFC(ctx, client, ck.domain)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
chain, _, err := client.CreateOrderCert(ctx, o.FinalizeURL, csr, true)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
leaf, err = validCert(ck, chain, key, m.now())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return chain, leaf, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// verifyRFC runs the identifier (domain) order-based authorization flow for RFC compliant CAs
|
|
// using each applicable ACME challenge type.
|
|
func (m *Manager) verifyRFC(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string) (*acme.Order, error) {
|
|
// Try each supported challenge type starting with a new order each time.
|
|
// The nextTyp index of the next challenge type to try is shared across
|
|
// all order authorizations: if we've tried a challenge type once and it didn't work,
|
|
// it will most likely not work on another order's authorization either.
|
|
challengeTypes := m.supportedChallengeTypes()
|
|
nextTyp := 0 // challengeTypes index
|
|
AuthorizeOrderLoop:
|
|
for {
|
|
o, err := client.AuthorizeOrder(ctx, acme.DomainIDs(domain))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
// Remove all hanging authorizations to reduce rate limit quotas
|
|
// after we're done.
|
|
defer func(urls []string) {
|
|
go m.deactivatePendingAuthz(urls)
|
|
}(o.AuthzURLs)
|
|
|
|
// Check if there's actually anything we need to do.
|
|
switch o.Status {
|
|
case acme.StatusReady:
|
|
// Already authorized.
|
|
return o, nil
|
|
case acme.StatusPending:
|
|
// Continue normal Order-based flow.
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: invalid new order status %q; order URL: %q", o.Status, o.URI)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Satisfy all pending authorizations.
|
|
for _, zurl := range o.AuthzURLs {
|
|
z, err := client.GetAuthorization(ctx, zurl)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if z.Status != acme.StatusPending {
|
|
// We are interested only in pending authorizations.
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
// Pick the next preferred challenge.
|
|
var chal *acme.Challenge
|
|
for chal == nil && nextTyp < len(challengeTypes) {
|
|
chal = pickChallenge(challengeTypes[nextTyp], z.Challenges)
|
|
nextTyp++
|
|
}
|
|
if chal == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unable to satisfy %q for domain %q: no viable challenge type found", z.URI, domain)
|
|
}
|
|
// Respond to the challenge and wait for validation result.
|
|
cleanup, err := m.fulfill(ctx, client, chal, domain)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
continue AuthorizeOrderLoop
|
|
}
|
|
defer cleanup()
|
|
if _, err := client.Accept(ctx, chal); err != nil {
|
|
continue AuthorizeOrderLoop
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, z.URI); err != nil {
|
|
continue AuthorizeOrderLoop
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// All authorizations are satisfied.
|
|
// Wait for the CA to update the order status.
|
|
o, err = client.WaitOrder(ctx, o.URI)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
continue AuthorizeOrderLoop
|
|
}
|
|
return o, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func pickChallenge(typ string, chal []*acme.Challenge) *acme.Challenge {
|
|
for _, c := range chal {
|
|
if c.Type == typ {
|
|
return c
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (m *Manager) supportedChallengeTypes() []string {
|
|
m.challengeMu.RLock()
|
|
defer m.challengeMu.RUnlock()
|
|
typ := []string{"tls-alpn-01"}
|
|
if m.tryHTTP01 {
|
|
typ = append(typ, "http-01")
|
|
}
|
|
return typ
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// deactivatePendingAuthz relinquishes all authorizations identified by the elements
|
|
// of the provided uri slice which are in "pending" state.
|
|
// It ignores revocation errors.
|
|
//
|
|
// deactivatePendingAuthz takes no context argument and instead runs with its own
|
|
// "detached" context because deactivations are done in a goroutine separate from
|
|
// that of the main issuance or renewal flow.
|
|
func (m *Manager) deactivatePendingAuthz(uri []string) {
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
for _, u := range uri {
|
|
z, err := client.GetAuthorization(ctx, u)
|
|
if err == nil && z.Status == acme.StatusPending {
|
|
client.RevokeAuthorization(ctx, u)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// fulfill provisions a response to the challenge chal.
|
|
// The cleanup is non-nil only if provisioning succeeded.
|
|
func (m *Manager) fulfill(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, chal *acme.Challenge, domain string) (cleanup func(), err error) {
|
|
switch chal.Type {
|
|
case "tls-alpn-01":
|
|
cert, err := client.TLSALPN01ChallengeCert(chal.Token, domain)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
m.putCertToken(ctx, domain, &cert)
|
|
return func() { go m.deleteCertToken(domain) }, nil
|
|
case "http-01":
|
|
resp, err := client.HTTP01ChallengeResponse(chal.Token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
p := client.HTTP01ChallengePath(chal.Token)
|
|
m.putHTTPToken(ctx, p, resp)
|
|
return func() { go m.deleteHTTPToken(p) }, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unknown challenge type %q", chal.Type)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// putCertToken stores the token certificate with the specified name
|
|
// in both m.certTokens map and m.Cache.
|
|
func (m *Manager) putCertToken(ctx context.Context, name string, cert *tls.Certificate) {
|
|
m.challengeMu.Lock()
|
|
defer m.challengeMu.Unlock()
|
|
if m.certTokens == nil {
|
|
m.certTokens = make(map[string]*tls.Certificate)
|
|
}
|
|
m.certTokens[name] = cert
|
|
m.cachePut(ctx, certKey{domain: name, isToken: true}, cert)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// deleteCertToken removes the token certificate with the specified name
|
|
// from both m.certTokens map and m.Cache.
|
|
func (m *Manager) deleteCertToken(name string) {
|
|
m.challengeMu.Lock()
|
|
defer m.challengeMu.Unlock()
|
|
delete(m.certTokens, name)
|
|
if m.Cache != nil {
|
|
ck := certKey{domain: name, isToken: true}
|
|
m.Cache.Delete(context.Background(), ck.String())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// httpToken retrieves an existing http-01 token value from an in-memory map
|
|
// or the optional cache.
|
|
func (m *Manager) httpToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath string) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
m.challengeMu.RLock()
|
|
defer m.challengeMu.RUnlock()
|
|
if v, ok := m.httpTokens[tokenPath]; ok {
|
|
return v, nil
|
|
}
|
|
if m.Cache == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: no token at %q", tokenPath)
|
|
}
|
|
return m.Cache.Get(ctx, httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// putHTTPToken stores an http-01 token value using tokenPath as key
|
|
// in both in-memory map and the optional Cache.
|
|
//
|
|
// It ignores any error returned from Cache.Put.
|
|
func (m *Manager) putHTTPToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath, val string) {
|
|
m.challengeMu.Lock()
|
|
defer m.challengeMu.Unlock()
|
|
if m.httpTokens == nil {
|
|
m.httpTokens = make(map[string][]byte)
|
|
}
|
|
b := []byte(val)
|
|
m.httpTokens[tokenPath] = b
|
|
if m.Cache != nil {
|
|
m.Cache.Put(ctx, httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath), b)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// deleteHTTPToken removes an http-01 token value from both in-memory map
|
|
// and the optional Cache, ignoring any error returned from the latter.
|
|
//
|
|
// If m.Cache is non-nil, it blocks until Cache.Delete returns without a timeout.
|
|
func (m *Manager) deleteHTTPToken(tokenPath string) {
|
|
m.challengeMu.Lock()
|
|
defer m.challengeMu.Unlock()
|
|
delete(m.httpTokens, tokenPath)
|
|
if m.Cache != nil {
|
|
m.Cache.Delete(context.Background(), httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// httpTokenCacheKey returns a key at which an http-01 token value may be stored
|
|
// in the Manager's optional Cache.
|
|
func httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath string) string {
|
|
return path.Base(tokenPath) + "+http-01"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// startRenew starts a cert renewal timer loop, one per domain.
|
|
//
|
|
// The loop is scheduled in two cases:
|
|
// - a cert was fetched from cache for the first time (wasn't in m.state)
|
|
// - a new cert was created by m.createCert
|
|
//
|
|
// The key argument is a certificate private key.
|
|
// The exp argument is the cert expiration time (NotAfter).
|
|
func (m *Manager) startRenew(ck certKey, key crypto.Signer, exp time.Time) {
|
|
m.renewalMu.Lock()
|
|
defer m.renewalMu.Unlock()
|
|
if m.renewal[ck] != nil {
|
|
// another goroutine is already on it
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if m.renewal == nil {
|
|
m.renewal = make(map[certKey]*domainRenewal)
|
|
}
|
|
dr := &domainRenewal{m: m, ck: ck, key: key}
|
|
m.renewal[ck] = dr
|
|
dr.start(exp)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// stopRenew stops all currently running cert renewal timers.
|
|
// The timers are not restarted during the lifetime of the Manager.
|
|
func (m *Manager) stopRenew() {
|
|
m.renewalMu.Lock()
|
|
defer m.renewalMu.Unlock()
|
|
for name, dr := range m.renewal {
|
|
delete(m.renewal, name)
|
|
dr.stop()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (m *Manager) accountKey(ctx context.Context) (crypto.Signer, error) {
|
|
const keyName = "acme_account+key"
|
|
|
|
// Previous versions of autocert stored the value under a different key.
|
|
const legacyKeyName = "acme_account.key"
|
|
|
|
genKey := func() (*ecdsa.PrivateKey, error) {
|
|
return ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if m.Cache == nil {
|
|
return genKey()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, keyName)
|
|
if err == ErrCacheMiss {
|
|
data, err = m.Cache.Get(ctx, legacyKeyName)
|
|
}
|
|
if err == ErrCacheMiss {
|
|
key, err := genKey()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
|
if err := encodeECDSAKey(&buf, key); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := m.Cache.Put(ctx, keyName, buf.Bytes()); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return key, nil
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
priv, _ := pem.Decode(data)
|
|
if priv == nil || !strings.Contains(priv.Type, "PRIVATE") {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: invalid account key found in cache")
|
|
}
|
|
return parsePrivateKey(priv.Bytes)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (m *Manager) acmeClient(ctx context.Context) (*acme.Client, error) {
|
|
m.clientMu.Lock()
|
|
defer m.clientMu.Unlock()
|
|
if m.client != nil {
|
|
return m.client, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
client := m.Client
|
|
if client == nil {
|
|
client = &acme.Client{DirectoryURL: DefaultACMEDirectory}
|
|
}
|
|
if client.Key == nil {
|
|
var err error
|
|
client.Key, err = m.accountKey(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if client.UserAgent == "" {
|
|
client.UserAgent = "autocert"
|
|
}
|
|
var contact []string
|
|
if m.Email != "" {
|
|
contact = []string{"mailto:" + m.Email}
|
|
}
|
|
a := &acme.Account{Contact: contact, ExternalAccountBinding: m.ExternalAccountBinding}
|
|
_, err := client.Register(ctx, a, m.Prompt)
|
|
if err == nil || isAccountAlreadyExist(err) {
|
|
m.client = client
|
|
err = nil
|
|
}
|
|
return m.client, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// isAccountAlreadyExist reports whether the err, as returned from acme.Client.Register,
|
|
// indicates the account has already been registered.
|
|
func isAccountAlreadyExist(err error) bool {
|
|
if err == acme.ErrAccountAlreadyExists {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
ae, ok := err.(*acme.Error)
|
|
return ok && ae.StatusCode == http.StatusConflict
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (m *Manager) hostPolicy() HostPolicy {
|
|
if m.HostPolicy != nil {
|
|
return m.HostPolicy
|
|
}
|
|
return defaultHostPolicy
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (m *Manager) renewBefore() time.Duration {
|
|
if m.RenewBefore > renewJitter {
|
|
return m.RenewBefore
|
|
}
|
|
return 720 * time.Hour // 30 days
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (m *Manager) now() time.Time {
|
|
if m.nowFunc != nil {
|
|
return m.nowFunc()
|
|
}
|
|
return time.Now()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// certState is ready when its mutex is unlocked for reading.
|
|
type certState struct {
|
|
sync.RWMutex
|
|
locked bool // locked for read/write
|
|
key crypto.Signer // private key for cert
|
|
cert [][]byte // DER encoding
|
|
leaf *x509.Certificate // parsed cert[0]; always non-nil if cert != nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// tlscert creates a tls.Certificate from s.key and s.cert.
|
|
// Callers should wrap it in s.RLock() and s.RUnlock().
|
|
func (s *certState) tlscert() (*tls.Certificate, error) {
|
|
if s.key == nil {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing signer")
|
|
}
|
|
if len(s.cert) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing certificate")
|
|
}
|
|
return &tls.Certificate{
|
|
PrivateKey: s.key,
|
|
Certificate: s.cert,
|
|
Leaf: s.leaf,
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// certRequest generates a CSR for the given common name.
|
|
func certRequest(key crypto.Signer, name string, ext []pkix.Extension) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
req := &x509.CertificateRequest{
|
|
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: name},
|
|
DNSNames: []string{name},
|
|
ExtraExtensions: ext,
|
|
}
|
|
return x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, req, key)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Attempt to parse the given private key DER block. OpenSSL 0.9.8 generates
|
|
// PKCS#1 private keys by default, while OpenSSL 1.0.0 generates PKCS#8 keys.
|
|
// OpenSSL ecparam generates SEC1 EC private keys for ECDSA. We try all three.
|
|
//
|
|
// Inspired by parsePrivateKey in crypto/tls/tls.go.
|
|
func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (crypto.Signer, error) {
|
|
if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
|
|
return key, nil
|
|
}
|
|
if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
|
|
switch key := key.(type) {
|
|
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
|
|
return key, nil
|
|
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
|
|
return key, nil
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown private key type in PKCS#8 wrapping")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if key, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(der); err == nil {
|
|
return key, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: failed to parse private key")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validCert parses a cert chain provided as der argument and verifies the leaf and der[0]
|
|
// correspond to the private key, the domain and key type match, and expiration dates
|
|
// are valid. It doesn't do any revocation checking.
|
|
//
|
|
// The returned value is the verified leaf cert.
|
|
func validCert(ck certKey, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer, now time.Time) (leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) {
|
|
// parse public part(s)
|
|
var n int
|
|
for _, b := range der {
|
|
n += len(b)
|
|
}
|
|
pub := make([]byte, n)
|
|
n = 0
|
|
for _, b := range der {
|
|
n += copy(pub[n:], b)
|
|
}
|
|
x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificates(pub)
|
|
if err != nil || len(x509Cert) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: no public key found")
|
|
}
|
|
// verify the leaf is not expired and matches the domain name
|
|
leaf = x509Cert[0]
|
|
if now.Before(leaf.NotBefore) {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate is not valid yet")
|
|
}
|
|
if now.After(leaf.NotAfter) {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: expired certificate")
|
|
}
|
|
if err := leaf.VerifyHostname(ck.domain); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
// renew certificates revoked by Let's Encrypt in January 2022
|
|
if isRevokedLetsEncrypt(leaf) {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate was probably revoked by Let's Encrypt")
|
|
}
|
|
// ensure the leaf corresponds to the private key and matches the certKey type
|
|
switch pub := leaf.PublicKey.(type) {
|
|
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
|
prv, ok := key.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key type does not match public key type")
|
|
}
|
|
if pub.N.Cmp(prv.N) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key does not match public key")
|
|
}
|
|
if !ck.isRSA && !ck.isToken {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: key type does not match expected value")
|
|
}
|
|
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
|
prv, ok := key.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key type does not match public key type")
|
|
}
|
|
if pub.X.Cmp(prv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(prv.Y) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key does not match public key")
|
|
}
|
|
if ck.isRSA && !ck.isToken {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: key type does not match expected value")
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown public key algorithm")
|
|
}
|
|
return leaf, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/2022-01-25-issue-with-tls-alpn-01-validation-method/170450
|
|
var letsEncryptFixDeployTime = time.Date(2022, time.January, 26, 00, 48, 0, 0, time.UTC)
|
|
|
|
// isRevokedLetsEncrypt returns whether the certificate is likely to be part of
|
|
// a batch of certificates revoked by Let's Encrypt in January 2022. This check
|
|
// can be safely removed from May 2022.
|
|
func isRevokedLetsEncrypt(cert *x509.Certificate) bool {
|
|
O := cert.Issuer.Organization
|
|
return len(O) == 1 && O[0] == "Let's Encrypt" &&
|
|
cert.NotBefore.Before(letsEncryptFixDeployTime)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type lockedMathRand struct {
|
|
sync.Mutex
|
|
rnd *mathrand.Rand
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (r *lockedMathRand) int63n(max int64) int64 {
|
|
r.Lock()
|
|
n := r.rnd.Int63n(max)
|
|
r.Unlock()
|
|
return n
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// For easier testing.
|
|
var (
|
|
// Called when a state is removed.
|
|
testDidRemoveState = func(certKey) {}
|
|
)
|